Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ECON Publications

Department of Economics

1988

Voting for Wage Concessions: The Case of the 1982 GM-UAW
Negotiations
Bruce Kaufman
Georgia State University, bkaufman@gsu.edu

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University, jorgemartinez@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bruce Kaufman and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. “Voting for Wage Concessions: The Case of the 1982 GMUAW Negotiations,” with Bruce Kaufman. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41, no. 2 (January 1988):
183-194.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ECON Publications by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

Industrial and Labor Relations Review
VOLUME 41

NUMBER 2

JANUARY 1988

PROPERTY OF
ARTICLES
Voting on Contracts in the Auto Industry
Voting for Wage Concessions: The
Case of the 1982 GM-UAW
Negotiations
Union Bargaining Decisions and
Contract Ratifications: The 1982
and 1984 Auto Agreements

JAN ] 91988
Brucq
nan and
Jorgr MXrtmcz-Va
Vazquez
Peter Cappelli and
W. P. Sterling

Discussion by the Authors
Determinants of Chief Executive
Officer Compensation

John R. Deckop

Comparable Worth: Limited Coverage
and the Exacerbation of Inequality

Robert S. Smith

Equal Employment Opportunity in
Japan: A View from the West

Linda N. Edwards

The Effect of Grievants' Gender on
Arbitration Decisions

Brian Bemmels

Bargaining and the Determinants of
Teacher Salaries

Todd Easton

The New York Agency Shop Fee and
the Constitution After Ellis
and Hudson
Satisfaction with Union Representation

Richard Briffault
Jack Fiorito, Daniel G.
Gallagher, and Cynthia V.
Fukami

BOOK REVIEWS
Labor-Management Relations
labor's New Choice: Unions and the Mass Media. By Sara U. Douglas. Reviewed by Sue
Dawson.
Labor Relations and the Arts, Vol. 16, Nos. 1 and 2. By Joan Jeffri. Reviewed by Richard N.
Goldstein.
Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey. By H. Gregg Lewis. Reviewed by Melvin W. Reder.
The Car Industry: Labour Relations and Industrial Adjustment. By David Marsden, Timothy
Morris, Paul Willman, and Stephen Wood. Reviewed by Vladimir Pucik.
The Sports Industry and Collective Bargaining. Bv Paul D. Staudohar. Reviewed by Roger G.
Noll.
Labor and Employment Law
The Immigration Reform Law of 1986. By Nancy Humel Montwieler. Reviewed by Vernon M.
Briggs, Jr.
Deregulation and the Decline of the Unionized Trucking Industry. By Charles R. Perry. Reviewed
by Wallace Hendricks.
Employee Selection: Legal and Practical Alternatives to Compliance and Litigation, 2d Edition.
Edited by Edward E. Potter. Reviewed by Nancy R. Hauserman.

182

INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Labor Law and Industrial Relations in the Federal Republic of Germany. By Manfred Weiss.
Reviewed by Andrei S. Markovits.

317

Economic and Social Security and Substandard Working Conditions
Asbestos: Its Human Cost. By Jock McCulloch. Reviewed by William G. Johnson.

317
318

Public Employee Retirement Systems: The Structure and Politics of Teacher Pensions. By Suzanne
Saunders Taylor. Reviewed by Michael Kahn.

319

Prevailing Wage Legislation: The Davis-Bacon Act, State "Little Davis-Bacon" Acts, the
Walsh-Healey Act, and the Service Contract Act. By Armand J. Thieblot, Jr. Reviewed by
Robert S. Goldfarb.

319

The Regulatory Impact on Pensions. By Wayne Wendling, Connie Crabb-Velez, and Melody A.
Carlsen. Reviewed by Emily S. Andrews.

320

The Economic Emergence of Women. By Barbara R. Bergmann. Reviewed by Andrea H. Beller.

Labor Economics
The Economics of Labor Markets and Labor Relations. By Bruce E. Kaufman. Reviewed by Paul
F. Gerhart.

322

Human Resources, Personnel, and Organizational Behavior
Inside the Circle: A Union Guide to QWL. By Mike Parker. Reviewed by Harry C. Katz.

323
323

Employee Ownership in America: The Equity Solution. By Corey Rosen, Katherine J. Klein, and
Karen M. Young. Reviewed by Mark D. Larson.

325

The Psychosocial Consequences of Natural and Alienated Labor. By Michael L. Schwalbe.
Reviewed by Christopher Gunn.

326

The Thinking Organization: Dynamics of Organizational Social Cognition. By Henry P. Sims, Jr.,
Dennis A. Gioia, and Associates. Reviewed by Steven C. Currall.

327

HRM Trends and Challenges. Edited by Richard E. Walton and Paul R. Lawrence. Reviewed
by James A. Craft.

328

Job Evaluation. International Labour Office. Reviewed by Donald P. Schwab.

International and Comparative Industrial Relations
International and Comparative Industrial Relations: A Study of Developed Market Economies.
Edited by G.J. Bamber and R. D. Lansbury. Reviewed by Wolfgang Streeck.

329

Women and the Economy: A Comparative Study of Britain and the USA. By A. T. Mallier and
M.J. Rosser. Reviewed by Alice Nakamura.

330

Historical Studies
Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation by Sex During World War II. By Ruth
Milkman. Reviewed by lleen A. DeVault.

331

Information Sources
The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada, 1986. Edited by Pradeep Kumar, with Mary
Lou Coates and David Arrowsmith. Reviewed by Thomas R. Knight.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

333

334

vy

VOTING FOR WAGE CONCESSIONS: THE CASE
OF THE 1982 GM-UAW NEGOTIATIONS
BRUCE E. KAUFMAN and JORGE MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ*

The authors of this paper use the median voter model to predict the
patterns of rank-and-file voting on wage concessions in a multiplant
setting, then test those predictions using data from the 1982 GM-UAW
negotiations. The model predicts that workers in plants with large
layoffs will vote in favor of a wage concession only if they believe that a
concession will save their jobs. Surprisingly, workers in plants with
growing or stable employment are also actually more likely to vote Yes.
A third prediction is that the Yes vote will be smallest in plants with the
most adversarial labor relations. The empirical analysis supports all
three predictions.

O

NE of the most important industrial

relations developments of the 1980s
has been the emergence and spread of
concession bargaining. Mitchell (1985)
estimates that between 1980 and 1984,
one-third to one-half of all unionized
workers were covered under new con
tracts that froze or cut wage rates. Many
other employers demanded wage conces
sions but were unable to obtain them. In a
number of cases, in fact, union workers
* The authors are Associate Professors of Econom
ics at Georgia State University. They thank the
College of Business Administration of Georgia State
University for financial support, the United Automo
bile Workers Union and the General Motors Corpo
ration for data, and David Sjoquist for helpful
comments.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Although this article, and the one
following, deal with the same subject—the determi
nants of contract ratification votes in the auto
industry—and analyze similar voting data, they were
prepared quite independently of each other. By a
happy coincidence, however, both papers were
submitted to the Review, and later accepted, at about
the same time. We thought it would be interesting to
ask each set of authors to compare the two papers,
and they have done so in comments that appear
following the second paper.

voted down concessions even when the
employer threatened to close the plant or
declare bankruptcy if wage relief was not
given (see Easterbrook 1983).
Despite the prevalence of concession
bargaining, there has been relatively little
research on the factors that influence a
union's policy toward granting wage con
cessions. To the best of our knowledge,
the only case study of union wage conces
sions to be published in the last ten years is
Cappelli's (1985) analysis of concession
bargaining in the meat packing and tire
industries. His study, however, focused
primarily on whether a union will agree to
negotiate over concessions, not whether
concessions are actually accepted. As we
shall show, this distinction is an important
one. In earlier years, by way of contrast, a
number of case studies of union wage
policy in a crisis situation were published
(Herrnstadt 1954; Levinson 1960; Greenberg 1968; Juris 1969). But although these
studies contributed a number of insights
about union attitudes toward concession
bargaining, none developed a formal
model of union wage policy from which
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hypotheses could be deduced and tested,
nor did any perform a quantitative analy
sis of the factors that influence union
members to vote for or against concessions
in the contract ratification process.
In this paper we attempt to fill these
gaps in the literature by studying the wage
concession negotiated between the Gen
eral Motors Corporation and the United
Automobile Workers Union in April 1982.
This analysis is unique in several respects.
First, previous studies have focused on
concession bargaining at the level of the
individual plant; this study examines con
cession bargaining in a multiplant firm
with more than 170 separate bargaining
units. Second, we use a median voter
model of union behavior to derive hypoth
eses concerning the pattern of voting in a
multiplant setting such as at GM. Several
of these hypotheses are noteworthy, we
believe, because they contradict conven
tional wisdom as to which bargaining units
should be most likely to vote for and
against wage concessions. A third feature
of the paper is that these hypotheses are
tested through a regression analysis of the
voting pattern among the UAW bargain
ing units in the 1982 GM ratification vote.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous
published study has examined actual vot
ing data from a union contract ratifica
tion.
Background to Concessions
Over most of the post—World War II
period the UAW was able to win wage and
benefit increases for its members at Gen
eral Motors and the other auto producers
that substantially exceeded the economywide average. Between 1950 and 1980, for
example, the ratio of hourly earnings of
auto assemblers to production workers in
the private nonagricultural economy rose
from 1.18 to 1.55 (Katz 1985:21). Factors
contributing to the union's bargaining
success included an inelastic labor demand
curve in the auto industry, strong secular
growth in auto sales, and the union's
ability to impose large strike costs on the
producers.

Although there were signs of trouble
when the 1979 auto contracts were signed,
particularly given the perilous financial
condition of Chrysler, neither the auto
companies nor the union could foresee
the severity of the economic crisis that lay
ahead. Auto production peaked in 1978 at
9.2 million units, and then began to slide.
In 1979 production was off only moder
ately (8.1 million), but by 1982 it had
plummeted to 5.1 million units. The most
important reasons for the decline in
domestic auto sales were the shift in
consumer demand to compact and subcompact cars due to the oil price shocks (see
Hunker 1983), the recessions of 1980 and
1981—82, and the double-digit interest
rates.
As sales declined, so did employment.
At General Motors, employment of hourly
workers plunged by one-third between
1979 and 1982. At the time of the
concession vote in April 1982, 140,000
GM workers were on indefinite layoff.
The decline in employment was not evenly
spread across plants, however: some were
hit far worse than others. Of GM's 25
assembly plants, for example, between
1979 and 1982 six closed, five
were
reduced from two shifts to one, five kept
two shifts but reduced the line speed, and
eight maintained production at 1979 lev
els.1
In the fall of 1981 Ford and GM asked
the UAW to reopen the national contract,
but the union refused. By early 1982,
however, the crisis had deepened enough
that the union reluctantly agreed. Facing
the union leadership were the following
facts. First, in February 1982 car sales hit
the lowest level since 1948, with no
upswing in sight. Second, indefinite lay
offs in the auto industry had been above
150,000 for two years. Many laid-off
workers, therefore, had exhausted their
SUB payments, with little prospect of
re-employment in the industry. Third, in
February GM announced seven plant
closings. Finally, there was a growing
1

These data come from Ward's Automotive Yearbook

(1980:106; 1983:69).
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realization on the part of the union
leaders that the crisis in the industry
would not completely disappear when the
recession ended, but rather was the result
of fundamental structural changes that
opened up the high-cost domestic industry
to much greater competition. One re
sponse of the union was to try to limit
competition from foreign producers
through legislative enactment of a domesr
tic content bill and stricter import quotas.
Since both proposals faced considerable
opposition from the Reagan administra
tion, the UAW leadership realized that at
least part of the solution to the industry's
problems would have to come from
concessions at the bargaining table.
The GM Concession Contract
In March 1982 the UAW Executive
Council and the General Motors Corpora
tion announced agreement on a new
contract that contained significant cost
concessions on the union's part. An impor
tant consideration for GM was that several
weeks earlier a similar pact had been
reached at Ford. The contract was a
30-month agreement. The union agreed
to a freeze of base wage rates, elimination
of the annual improvement factor (an
annual 3 percent deferred wage increase),
postponement of cost of living (COLA)
payments, and elimination of all paid
personal holidays (9 per year). The sav
ings in labor cost to General Motors over
the life of the contract was estimated at 10
percent of current labor cost, or about $2
per hour.2 Also of significance was the
agreement by the union that individual
locals could reopen plant-level supplemen
tal contracts if a revision of work rules or
work practices would make it possible for
the company to continue production at
the plant.
In return for these concessions, the
2 The material in this section is drawn from the
United Automobile Workers Union newspaper,
UAW-GM Report (March 1983), and a pamphlet,
Analysis: General Motors Settlement (1982), put out by
l.ocals Opposed to Concessions (UAW-LOC).
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company made a number of commitments
to the union. First, GM agreed to rescind
the announced closing of four plants, and
instituted a 24-month moratorium on
other plant closings related to outsourc
ing. Second, the company established a
profit sharing program. Third, a "Guaran
teed Income Stream" program (GIS) was
established that guaranteed 50 percent or
more of hourly earnings until age 62 for
two categories of worker: those employed
as of March 1, 1982, with 10 years or more
of seniority, who were laid off due to plant
closings, and those employed as of the
same date who had 15 years or more of
seniority and were laid off for any other
reason. Finally, the company also agreed
to advance up to $200 million to the SUB
fund and to begin a lifetime employment
experiment at four plants.
Opinion in the UAW about the conces
sion contract was sharply split. The na
tional leadership attempted to sell the
package to the membership by stressing
the improved job security the contract
would bring and the projected payments
from the profit sharing program. In this
spirit, union president Douglas Fraser
endorsed the contract as a way to "stop the
hemorrhaging of GM workers' jobs" by
allowing GM to be more cost-competitive
with the Japanese. The headline of the
union's newspaper to the GM membership
declared "Contract to Save Thousands of
jobs."
There was, however, also considerable
opposition to the concession contract in
the union. A group called "Locals Op
posed to Concessions" (LOG) actively
lobbied the membership to vote against
the contract. According to LOC, "This
contract contributes nothing to job secu
rity, and actually will cost our members
10,000 jobs as well as $3 billion dollars in
wages and benefits." In support of this
contention, LOC argued that the elimina
tion of the paid personal holidays meant
that existing employees would be working
4 percent more hours, allowing the com
pany to cut employment by 10,000 work
ers; the GIS program would do nothing
for the 140,000 GM workers on layoff,

•J
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since it only protected workers employed
as of March 1, 1982; the agreement by the
union to allow individual locals to reopen
plant-level agreements would decrease job
security, since locals would become in
volved in a bidding war for additional
work; and the precarious financial posi
tion of the companies was not due to
excessive labor cost but was the result of
management waste and inefficiency and
external economic conditions such as the
rise in gas prices, double-digit interest
rates, and the overvalued dollar.
The concession contract was put to a
vote of the membership in April 1982.
Under the UAW constitution, both em
ployed and laid-off members were eligible
to vote. The contract was narrowly ap
proved by a 52 percent majority. Of the
170 bargaining units at GM, 116 voted for
the concessions and 54 voted against it.
Although the bargaining units voting
against concessions were distinctly in the
minority, within those units the average
No vote was 70 percent.
Theoretical Model
The voting outcome on the GM contract
concession raises two interesting ques
tions. First, what factors determine whether
a majority of the rank and file at the
company will vote for or against a wage
concession? Second, what factors explain
the pattern of voting among the bargain
ing units? An answer to these questions
requires a theoretical model of union
behavior. Although there are several such
models in the literature, the most appro
priate, in our opinion, is the median voter
model, since it explicitly captures the
political nature of union decision-making
and the inherent conflict of interests that
exists among the union membership over
the desirability of a wage cut.3 A median
Other models of union behavior include the
monopoly model and the efficient contract model
(see MaCurdy and Pencavel 1986). Several fundamen
tal features, however, render these models inade
quate to study union acceptance of wage concessions.
First, both the monopoly and efficient contract
models assume identical preferences among the rank
and file for the union's wage policy. Quite clearly,
3

voter analysis of union wage concessions
was undertaken in Kaufman and MartinezVazquez (1987) for the case of a singleplant bargaining structure. In this section
we adapt that model to the case of a union
with multiple bargaining units.
As originally shown by Bowen (1943), if
elections are decided by simple majority
rule and preferences are well ordered
(single-peaked) and a function of a single
variable, the preference of the median
voter in the electorate is the outcome that
will defeat all others in a sequence of
pairwise elections. To apply the median
voter model to union wage concessions,
several assumptions are necessary. After
listing these assumptions, we derive the
implications of the model concerning the
two questions we are trying to answer:
What are the determinants of (1) the
approval or rejection of the concession by
the majority of the membership and (2)
the support it receives from different
bargaining units? We then critically exam
ine the assumptions of the model and how
its implications change when some of the
original assumptions are relaxed.
First, it is assumed that new contracts
must be ratified by a majority of the rank
and file and that the electoral process in
the union allows a series of elections
among all possible pairs of outcomes.
Second, it is assumed that the wage rate is
the only issue in the negotiations, and that
each employed union member is treated
equally (i.e., there are no side-payments).
Third, it is assumed that there is a
well-known order of layoff for all UAW
members at General Motors; the determi
nants of this order are described below.
Finally, it is assumed that the union
leadership, out of a political instinct for
survival, actively pursues policies that will
this assumption is untenable both within a bargaining
unit and across units. Second, neither of the two
models recognizes that union decisions are the result
of a political process involving majority rule. There
fore, the monopoly and efficient contract models
cannot be used to explain the nature of the coalition
within a union that would favor a concession or to
predict unambiguously when the union will accept
such a policy.
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receive the support of a majority of the
rank and file.
The implications of the model can now
be derived with the help of Figure 1. Let
D\ represent the labor demand curve for
General Motors in 1979. Given the union
wage_ of Wi, total employment was L\\
L\—L represents the number of laid-off
workers at that date. We assume that the
L\ employed workers can be ordered
along the horizontal axis on the basis of
their order of potential layoff, the List
worker being the first to lose his or her
job, the Lnth being the last. Two assump
tions give rise to this rank ordering. First,
within a plant we assume, following the
actual practice at GM, that the order of
layoff is by seniority. Second, we assume
that across plants there is also a distinct
order of layoff based on differences in the
marginal cost of production, with layoffs
and shutdown taking place first at the
Wage

Type C Type B
Plants
Plants

Type A
Plants

Type A plants = plants experiencing massive layoffs.
Type B plants = plants experiencing some layoffs.
Type C plants = plants with steady employment.
L = total union membership,
t-i = employed membership at wage Hq.
L? = employed membership at wage W, after de
mand decreases to D2.
Ci = median union member.
H'„, = preferred wage of median member given de
mand curve D2.

Figure 1. Pattern of Voting Among Union
Members on a Tentative Wage
Concession Agreement.
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highest-cost plant, then at the next highestcost plant, and so on. We will attempt to
justify that assumption more fully below.
Because of the economic events outlined
above, the labor demand curve at General
Motors between 1979 and 1982 shifted to
the left as represented by the demand
curve D2, and at the prevailing wage of
Wj, employment fell to L2. We can
consider now the first question—will the
rank and file agree to a wage concession?
Assume that the median union member
in terms of the order of layoff is the f^th
worker. As shown in Kaufman and Marti
nez-Vazquez (1987), a necessary condition
for a majority Yes vote is that the median
voter be threatened with unemployment if
there is not a wage concession. Only then
will a majority of the union membership
find it in their self-interest to accept a
wage cut in order to preserve their jobs.
Given the way Figure 1 is drawn, this
condition is satisfied, since the L2- L\
layoffs include the median. The second
condition that is necessary for majority
approval of a wage cut is that the median
voter's new preferred wage Wm still yields
him or her a higher level of utility than
any other alternative outcome (such as
quitting and finding a new job or early
retirement). Thus, if the median member
could find other employment paying a
wage higher than Wm, he or she would be
better off to vote against the concession,
even though it means losing the present
job. The sufficient condition cannot be
directly shown in Figure 1. If both
conditions are satisfied, a proposed wage
concession from W] to Wm would win
majority approval by one vote in excess of
50 percent of the rank and file. Note that
any other wage proposed by the leader
ship would be defeated by Wm in a
sequence of pairwise elections.
Consider now the second question:
What determines why some bargaining
units voted heavily for the concession
contract whereas others voted heavily
against it? This question can also be
answered with the help of Figure 1. To do
so, we must explicitly focus on employ
ment prospects in different plants of the
company. To keep the graphical analysis

J
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manageable, we assume that each GM
plant is one of three possible types,
represented by Plants A, B, and C in
Figure 1. Given the new demand curve D2,
type A plants (the high-cost plants) either
are shut down or suffer massive layoffs,
type B plants continue to operate but
suffer some layoffs, and type C plants
continue to operate with 1979 levels of
employment. Although the assumption
that there are only three types of plants
clearly would be arbitrary in some circum
stances, most plants at General Motors in
the 1980—82 period did (as described
above) fall into one of these three groups.
Let us assume for the sake of argument
that, as in Figure 1, the number of layoffs
includes the median voter (the Lmth), and
also that the sufficient condition is satis
fied so that a majority of workers in the
company will support a concession from
Wi to Wm. Support for the concession,
however, will be quite different among the
three types of plants.
A key insight provided by the median
voter model is that the majority coalition
of the membership in favor of concessions
extends from the top of the layoff
distribution (the L„th worker) down to the
median (the Lmth). Surprisingly, although
the political pressure on the union leader
ship to negotiate concessions comes from
the Li — L laid-off workers, the workers
below the median are the ones who in the
actual vote will oppose concessions. The
reasoning is straightforward. The L,n — L
laid-off workers will vote against a wage
concession because at the wage W,„ they
will still remain unemployed. The Ln — Lm
workers, on the other hand, would vote
for the concession.
The rationale for a Yes vote on the part
of the L% —Lm workers is self-evident—a
wage cut from W\ to W% saves their jobs.
The remainder of the majority coalition in
favor of concessions comes from the
Ln — Li workers, who would keep their
jobs even without a concession. The
reason these workers would vote for a
wage cut to Wm is that if they did not the
median voter could, in a continuous
sequence of elections, form a different
majority coalition of union members (such
as those in the lower half of the layoff

distribution) who would support a larger
wage cut than Wm. Given the inevitability
of the concession, the L„ — L2 workers,
therefore, support Wm only because it
minimizes the pay cut they will have to
accept.
The implications of the model for the
voting pattern among bargaining units can
be summarized as follows. Contrary to
what might be expected, the vote in type A
plants (the plants that suffered massive
layoffs and in which a wage cut would not
save jobs) should be overwhelmingly op
posed to concessions. Because these plants
lost so many jobs, their workers would
support the initial decision to negotiate a
concession. Thus, as Cappelli (1985) claims,
the likelihood that a plant will agree to
negotiate a concession increases with the
number of layoffs experienced by the
plant's union members. Our model shows,
however, that in the actual vote the workers
in type A plants would vote against the
concession because it would not save their
jobs.
In type B plants, the model predicts that
the vote should be split, with some
workers favoring and others opposing a
concession. The workers voting against a
concession will be those below the median
in the layoff distribution who do not see
the concessions as being large enough to
save their jobs. Voting for the concession
in type B plants are two groups of
workers: those who are threatened with
layoff and see the concession as saving
their jobs, and those who have secure jobs
but want to avoid any larger cut in wages.
Finally, the vote in type C plants should
be consistently in favor of the concessions.
This prediction also seems counterintui
tive, since type C plants have experienced
no layoffs.4 But even though none of these
workers will lose their jobs if a concession
is defeated, they reluctantly vote for a
wage cut to Wm to avoid an even bigger
concession.
Qualifications. The predictions derived
so far are based on assumptions that in
4 This prediction is also unexpected since, as
argued by Cappelli (1985), the workers in type C
plants are the ones who are most likely to oppose the
initial decision to negotiate a concession.
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some cases clearly do not fully match the
case under study (the UAW and General
Motors in 1982). We therefore need to
discuss how relaxing these assumptions
affects the predictions of the model.
The first assumption concerns the na
ture of the electoral process. Rather than a
sequence of pairwise elections, the elec
toral process in the GM-UAW negotiations
is limited to one or at most a few votes.
This fact has a large impact on the
predicted voting pattern. The motivation
for the workers with relatively secure jobs
in type C plants to vote for the concession
is that if they do not, the majority of
laid-off workers could form a new coali
tion and win a majority vote for an even
larger wage cut. If, to take the extreme
case, there were only one election, the
pressure on type C plant workers to vote
Yes would be removed —they could vote
No and keep their jobs at the wage W]
with no threat of another vote. Given less
than perfect democracy, therefore, the
union leadership faces a serious problem
in gaining a majority Yes vote, since many
workers with job security may defect to the
side opposing a concession.
The limited nature of the electoral
process leads to a second consideration
ruled out in the simple model—the possi
bility of side-payments. As just noted, one
problem facing the union leadership is
that with only one or several votes, many
secure workers might vote against the
concession. One possible strategy on the
leadership's part is to "buy" the votes of
the secure workers by making sidepayments. One example of side-payments
in the GM-UAW contract is the GIS
program, for which only currently em
ployed workers with high seniority were
eligible. A second example is the profit
sharing program, again with value only
for currently employed workers. Paradox
ically, although the ultimate objective of
the concession contract is to protect union
members suffering (or threatened with)
the hardship of being laid off, the contract
is written to discriminate against them and
to benefit those with more secure jobs. An
implication of the model, therefore, is that
the No vote in type A plants will also be
due to resentment over the perceived
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inequity in the distribution of benefits
among the union rank and file.
A third consideration is the role of
uncertainty. Heavily influencing each work
er's vote are the questions whether he will
be laid off (how far to the left the labor
demand curve will shift) and whether a
wage concession will save his job (how
elastic the labor demand curve is). Al
though in the model the answers to these
questions were assumed to be known with
certainty, in the context of the economic
events of 1980—82 they were most likely
shrouded in uncertainty.
This uncertainty affects the model in
two ways. First, the necessary condition
for acceptance of a wage concession
changes slightly —it is not necessary that a
majority of the membership actually lose
their jobs at the prevailing wage Wj, but
only that a majority perceive a threat to
their jobs. Second, as Ross (1948:80-93)
emphasized, the typical union member is
likely to have a very imprecise guess as to
what the labor demand curve's position
and its elasticity are. Of course, the greater
the perceived elasticity of demand, the more
jobs a wage concession will be thought to
save and the bigger the Yes vote. One fac
tor affecting each worker's subjective esti
mate of the elasticity of demand will be the
attitude of his local president toward the
concession. Presumably, the local presi
dent would favor the concession if he thinks
that it would save or increase jobs in the
unit. A second factor will be the labor re
lations climate in the plant—the more adv
ersarial that climate, the more the workers
will distrust the company and its claims that
a cut in wages will save jobs. Of course, the
company can directly affect the worker's
estimate of the job-saving potential of a con
cession if, as at GM, it promises in advance
that certain plants will not be closed.
A final consideration is the number of
issues in the contract. To derive a unique
voting outcome, one of the necessary
assumptions in the median voter model is
that there is only one issue in the election.
In the GM-UAW contract, however, the
wage rate was only one of numerous
contract provisions; some of the others
were the GIS program, the profit sharing
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program, the moratorium on plant clos
ings, and the cut in paid personal holidays.
With so many issues open to vote, in a
sequence of elections, the median voter
model would generally produce no single
winner, but a series of cyclical majority
coalitions. But if the election process were
restricted to one single vote (the particular
contract submitted by the UAW leader
ship), we would expect support for the
contract to vary across plants according to
our analysis above.
Empirical Analysis
The model developed in the previous
section suggests a number of hypotheses
concerning the pattern of voting among
UAW bargaining units in the 1982 negoti
ations. In this section we use regression
analysis to test these hypotheses. The data,
as explained more fully below, came
largely from a survey questionnaire an
swered by the chairperson of each bargain
ing unit. The specification of the regres
sion is
(1)

ln[PYES /(l —

PYES)] = PO + PJEMP

national headquarters. The data for the
independent variables (except UN and
WAGE) were obtained from a questionnaire
mailed in early 1983 to the chairperson of
each bargaining unit. A total of 102 usable
questionnaires were returned, represent
ing a relatively high response rate of 60
percent. The mean of the variable PYES for
our sample was 55.5 percent, which is not
statistically different (by a t test) from the
population mean. Other characteristics of
the two distributions were also quite
similar.6
The regression results, reported in
Table 2, show an interesting voting pat
tern across bargaining units. They also
lend support to the predictions of the
model. Consider first the variables EMP,
SAVE, and EMP SAVE. The inducement for
the membership to vote Yes for the
concession is the prospect that the conces
sion will save jobs. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient for SAVE
shows that the vote for the concession was,
in fact, much higher in bargaining units
where the membership believed jobs would
be saved.7 The negative coefficient on the

+ (32SAVE + 03EMPSAVE + (34THREAT
+ 05CLOSE2 + 06CLOSE3 + p7REL2

+ P8REL3

+ PgSUPPORT + P10PARTS

+ PnWCOLLAR +

Pi2OTHER

+ P13YEAR + P14UN + P15WAGE + 6.

The unit of observation is the bargaining
unit. On the left-hand side of the equa
tion, PYES is the percentage of votes in
favor of the concessions. Estimation of the
equation with PYES as the dependent
variable using OLS could yield not only
inefficient estimates but also predicted
values outside the zero-one range. To
control for these difficulties, we employ
logit-weighted regression analysis in which
the dependent variable is the natural log
of the odds.5 The definitions and means
of the independent variables are given in
Table 1.
The data source for the voting results
was the official tally furnished by UAW
5 The weights used in the weighted least squares
regression were computed as: [NyPYES,(1 -PYES7)]'/2.
See Theil (1971).

6 For example, the standard deviations were 21.2
and 22.1 for the sample and population mean,
respectively. The skewness and Kurtosis measures
were, respectively, -.109 and -.175, and -.637
and -.524. The range was 85.8 for the sample and
95.1 for the population.
' The content validity of the variable SAVE is
admittedly subject to some question, since the data
came from an ex post response of the chairperson
rather than a survey of the membership prior to the
vote. Although the questionnaire specifically asked
the chairperson to assess the membership's belief
concerning whether jobs would be saved, it is possible
that the response we obtained reflected only the
chairperson's own personal opinion. If the chairper
son's opinion varied significantly, on average, from
the membership's, the resulting measurement error
would bias the estimated coefficient 011 the variable
SAVE toward zero. The coefficient is, however,
significantly different from zero.
It is also possible that the membership had no idea
of whether jobs would be saved and simply relied on
the opinion of the chairperson in making up their
mind whether to vote Yes or No. The fact that other
variables besides SUPPORT were statistically signifi
cant, and that the correlations between SUPPORT and
PYES and SUPPORT and SAVE were far from perfect
(-.53 and .45), suggests that the position of the
chairperson and the voting of the membership were
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Means.
Variable Name

Definition

Mean

PYES

Percent of votes cast in the bargaining unit in favor of the concessions.

EMP

Algebraic value of the percentage change in employment over the preceding year
(e.g., -20% or + 10%).

- 10.58

55.44

SAVE

Dummy variable equal to one if the chairperson reported that at the time of
the vote "membership believed the contract concessions would save jobs in their
bargaining unit." The omitted category is "concessions would not save jobs."

.45

EMP-SAVE

Interaction term.

.22

THREAT

Dummy variable equal to one if a plant in the bargaining unit was one of the
four that GM promised not to close if the concessions were approved.

.01

CLOSE2

Dummy variable equal to one if "membership worried somewhat" about the
plant closing.

.33

CLOSES

Dummy variable equal to one if "membership worried a lot" about the plant
closing. The omitted category is "membership not worried much."

.18

REL2

Dummy variable equal to one if "the relationship between the union and company, compared to other bargaining units, is about average."

.43

RELS

Dummy variable equal to one if "the relationship between the union and company is worse than average." The omitted category is "relations better than
average."

.15

Dummy variable equal to one if "the chairperson personally opposed the contract concessions." The omitted category is "chairperson supported concessions."

.34

Dummy variable equal to one if "workers are primarily engaged in parts
manufacture."

.41

Dummy variable equal to one if "workers are primarily engaged in R&D or
'white collar'jobs."

.08

Dummy variable equal to one if workers are engaged in "other" (e.g., warehousing, locomotive manufacture) jobs. The omitted category is "car and
truck assembly."

.27

WCOLLAR

YEAR

Year the plant or facility was built (calculated as year - 1900)

49.7

UN

Unemployment rate in April 1982 in the state in which the bargaining unit is
located.

11.98

WAGE

Average hourly earnings in 1982 in the SMSA or, if SMSA-level earnings
figures are not available, in the state.

10.06

Random error term.

interaction term EMP-SAVE indicates that
the prospect of saving jobs had a larger
positive impact on the percent Yes vote in
bargaining units that had previously suf
fered large declines in employment than
in other units. This result supports one of
the basic predictions of the model —that a
large Yes vote will occur in bargaining
indeed influenced by a consideration of benefits and
costs as predicted by the median voter model.
Finally, a third possibility is that the chairperson's
response about the membership's belief concerning
the number of jobs likely to be saved by the
concession was merely a post hoc rationalization of
how the membership voted. This assertion is difficult
to disprove, but we would note that the correlation
between PYES and SAVE (.45) is much less than 1.0.

units where large layoffs occur and the
membership believes that a concession will
restore jobs (type B plants in the model).
A second important prediction of the
model is that the weakest support for the
concessions will be in bargaining units that
had suffered large layoffs but in which the
membership did not believe jobs would be
saved by concession (type A plants). This
prediction is also supported by the results.
When SAVE is set equal to zero (and thus
EMP SAVE = 0) in Table 2, it is seen that
the larger the decline in employment over
the previous year (EMP takes negative
values), the lower the percent Yes vote. If
SAVE is set equal to one (implying the
membership believed jobs would be saved),
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Table 2. Determinants of the 1982

GM-UAW Concession Vote,
(logit-weighted regression results)
Independent
Variable
EMP
SAVE
EMP-SAVE
THREAT
CLOSE2
CLOSE3
REL2
REL3
SUPPORT
PARTS
WCOLLAR
OTHER
YEAR
UN
WAGE

Constant
R2 =

0.447

Estimated
Coefficient
0.313 x 102
0.454
-0.103 x 10"1
1.371
0.111

0.257
-0.425 x 10"1
-0.269
-0.532
0.469 x 10"1
0.338
0.137
-0.273 x 10"2
-0.183 x 10"1
0.278 x 10"2
-0.183
Pf = 0.442

t-statistic
4.27*
7.86*
6.09*
3.65*
2.91*
4.82*
1.10
5.11*
12.55*
1.06
3.64*
2.58*
2.67*
2.42*
4.72*
-

F = 78.44

* Significant at the .05 level.

however, bargaining units with large em
ployment losses were more likely to vote for
the concessions.8 Finally, perhaps the most
counterintuitive result but one predicted
by the model is that bargaining units that
had experienced a growth in employment
(type C plants in the model) also were
more likely than other plants to vote for
the concession (EMP takes positive values).9
Next, consider the variables THREAT,
CLOSE2, and CLOSE3. The coefficient on the
8 In addition to obtaining an estimate of the
percentage change in employment over the preced
ing year, the survey questionnaire also asked the
chairperson whether the bargaining unit's employ
ment had "increased," "remained the same," "de
creased somewhat," or "decreased a lot." The
responses were coded as dummy variables and used
in the regression equations in place of EMQ. (The
category "increased" was omitted from the equation
to serve as the reference group.) The estimated
coefficients were all negative and statistically signifi
cant. Each of the dummy variables was also inter
acted with the variable SAVE. All of the interaction
terms were positive and statistically significant.
9 If SAVE = 1, however, the regression results
indicate that type C plants are less likely to vote for
concessions, contrary to the predictions of the model.
This problem, we believe, is not serious, since of the
twelve plants in the sample that had EMP > 0, only
two also had SAVE = 1.

variable THREAT is positive and statistically
significant, indicating that the percent Yes
vote was higher in those plants that GM
threatened to close if concessions were not
approved than in other plants. The rela
tionship between a cut in wages and
increased employment opportunities was
quite clear for these bargaining units, and,
not unexpectedly, they voted heavily in
favor of the concession. The coefficients
on the variables CLOSE2 and CLOSE3 were
also positive and significant. The degree
of support for the concessions increased if
the members of the bargaining unit were
somewhat worried about the plant closing
and rose even further if they were quite
worried. These results suggest that union
members threatened by layoffs (i.e., those
in type B plants) regarded the concession
as a way to protect their jobs from a plant
closing.10
According to the model, a key determi
nant of the amount of support among the
membership for a concession is the degree
to which they believe both that a conces
sion is necessary to protect their jobs and
that it will increase their job security. We
hypothesize that the labor relations cli
mate between the company and union in
the bargaining unit has an important
impact on how the union membership
perceive these issues. In particular, it is
predicted that the more hostile or adversa
rial the relationship is, the lower the
percent Yes vote will be. The negative and
statistically significant coefficient on the
variable REL3 supports this prediction. The
coefficient for RF.L2 is also negative, though
statistically not significant. One implica
tion, therefore, is that a company is more
likely to win support for a concession if it
has established a cooperative, nonadversarial relationship with the union than if it
10 It can be argued that the effect of a threatened
plant closing on the percent Yes vote should also
depend on whether the membership thought the
concessions would save jobs. To test this possibility,
we included interaction terms CLOSE2-SAVE and
CLOSE3-SAVE in the regression. The coefficients on
these interaction terms were positive and statistically
significant, but the coefficients on CLOSE2 and CLOSE.!
fell to insignificance. The rest of the coefficients
remained largely unchanged from those reported in
Table 2.
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has not. A second important determinant
of the membership's perceptions of the
benefits and costs of a concession is the
position of the chairperson of their bar
gaining unit with respect to the conces
sion. The sign on the variable SUPPORT is
negative and statistically significant. This
finding indicates that the percent Yes vote
was lower where the chairperson opposed
the concession.
Additional variables in the model, to
control for differences across plants, are
YEAR, PARTS, WCOLLAR, and OTHER. Con
sider first the variable YEAR. The regres
sion results indicate that the newer the
plant, the lower was the percent Yes vote.
At first glance this result seems to contra
dict the median voter model, since it
predicts that workers in more secure jobs
(such as in new plants) would vote for the
concessions in order to avoid even larger
concessions in the future. As was pointed
out earlier, however, the incentive for
workers with secure jobs to vote for the
concessions is greatly reduced when they
do not face the threat of repeated elec
tions. We argued that one mechanism
used by the UAW leadership to gain a Yes
vote in this situation was to "bribe" secure
workers with additional benefits, such as
the Guaranteed Income Stream program.
For workers in new plants, however, this
inducement was probably not effective,
since they did not have the seniority to
qualify for the program; hence, as the
regression indicates, they voted against
acceptance of the concessions.
Next consider the variables PARTS,
WCOLLAR, and OTHER. Although workers
in parts plants were especially vulnerable
to layoff because of outsourcing, the
insignificant coefficient on the variable
PARTS suggests that once previous trends
in employment, the threat of plant clo
sure, and the likelihood of jobs being
saved by the concessions are controlled
for, there was no net difference between
the voting behavior of workers in these
plants and that of workers in assembly
plants. Other things equal, however, whitecollar workers and "other" workers were
more likely to vote for the concessions
than were assembly workers. It might be
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conjectured that this result reflects a less
antagonistic attitude toward the company
on the part of these workers relative to
production workers, but such an explana
tion is weakened by the fact that a variable
measuring the labor relations climate in
the bargaining unit is already included in
the regression.
The final two variables included in the
regression are UN and WAGE. The model
predicts that the attitude of the member
ship toward a concession should be influ
enced by their alternative employment
and income opportunities—the better those
opportunities, the lower the support for
the concession." Therefore, the unemploy
ment variable was expected to take a
positive sign and the wage variable a
negative sign. The sign on each variable,
however, is the opposite of that predicted,
and both coefficients are statistically signif
icant.12 One possible explanation for these
inconsistent results is that the information
used for these two variables is very
aggregated. For this reason, it may be that
these two variables, rather than serving as
proxies or the actual employment oppor
tunities facing General Motors workers,
are picking up regional differences across
plants.
Conclusion
Concession bargaining has been one of
the most important industrial relations
developments of the 1980s. Surprisingly,
however, there has been little research on
11 Another determinant of the alternative income
available to workers should they lose their job is the
level of unemployment benefits. An unemployment
benefits variable was not included in the regression,
however, since SUB payments from the company
equalized total benefits at 95 percent of take-home
pay across all states, eliminating any variation in this
variable. This statement must be qualified slightly,
since some workers in April 1982 were not receiving
full SL1B payments due to depletion of the fund, but
no data are available on the incidence of such
underpayment across plants.
12 To test the robustness of the regression, we
dropped the variables UN and WAGE from the
equation and then reestimated it. The results
(available from the authors on request) were quite
similar.
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the factors that determine whether a
union will agree to accept concessions. In
this paper we attempt to provide both
theoretical and empirical evidence on this
subject, through an analysis of the 1982
GM-UAW negotiations. The paper shows
that in a multiplant company such as
General Motors, there is likely to be a
considerable divergence of opinion among
the union membership over the desirabil
ity of a concession, reflecting the unequal
distribution across plants of the benefits
and costs of a wage cut.
To analyze this divergence of opinion,
we used the median voter model to derive
hypotheses concerning the pattern of
voting among plants for a concession
contract. Contrary to conventional wis
dom, the model predicts that in many
cases workers in plants that have experi
enced a large number of layoffs are the
ones most likely to vote against conces
sions, whereas workers in plants with

steady employment levels are more likely
to vote for the concession. The empirical
analysis of the voting data from the
GM-UAW contract ratification in 1982
lends considerable support to these hypoth
eses. As predicted, the strongest opposi
tion to the concessions came from plants
that had suffered large layoffs and in
which the membership did not believe the
concessions would save jobs. Where the
membership did believe that jobs would be
saved by a cut in labor cost, however, the
vote was much more in favor of conces
sions. The regression results also indicate
that, surprisingly, the vote for acceptance
of the concessions was higher in bargain
ing units where employment had re
mained steady or had increased during
the previous twelve months. Finally, we
also found, as hypothesized, that support
for the concessions was greater in plants
where the company and union had a
cooperative relationship.
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